# 1AR---Dartmouth---Round 2

## Expertise

### 1AR---Warming

#### Warming causes extinction. Non-linear feedback loops trigger pandemics, resource and border conflicts, and ecosystem collapse. Only our ev cites the scientific consensus. That’s Spangenberg.

### 1AR---Nuke Fires

#### Nuclear fires cause extinction. Nuclear plant failures release 400 times more radiation than nuclear weapons and shred global biodiversity. That’s Mousseau.

## Energy

### 1AR---AI Deterrence

#### Deterrence collapse is inevitable without AI operationalization. Failure to effectively integrate AI encourages Russian and Chinese gray zone probing that current systems are unable to detect and causes nuclear use through miscalc. That’s Lynch.

#### It solves the DA impact.

### 1AR---Energy Wars

#### Energy wars cause extinction. Global hotspots are on the brink now and energy demand is expected to increase 50 percent---competition leads to regional instabilities that spillover into nuclear war. That’s Heath.

## Japan Rearm Turn

### 1AR---No link

#### There’s no link to the turn

#### 1. Our advantage is the opposite of their link. We said pursuing unipolarity and security commitments will cause regional wars over hegemony, plan creates energy interdependence that increases our diplomatic and transactional standing, but there’s zero reason that makes it look like the US security commitment is stable.

#### 2. No reason Japan STOPs rearming in response to the plan, even if they miraculously conclude that the US security commitment is credible. They’ve read uniqueness cards that say they’re doing it in the squo---military programs aren’t the kind of thing you can just turn and around and reverse all willy-nilly because they require stable funding and contractual obligations.

### No Link---AT: Matsuda

#### No ev that says Japan ALONE deters China---says must coordinate with the US, but also concedes invasion will never happen,

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Japan has gradually embraced military power as one of the central components of its national strategy since the 2010s.38 Especially in the 2020s, Japan’s defense reforms have focused more on ways to generate effective combat power including the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities.39 Tokyo’s upgraded defense strategy is designed primarily for the archipelago state’s territorial defense. Nevertheless, the geographical proximity of Japan’s southwest islands suggests that a military action against Taiwan—either a full-scale invasion or a blockade—would likely have direct consequences for Japan’s national security, including territorial defense.40 As a result, there has been a growing debate on how Japan, alongside the United States, could deter Chinese aggression across the Taiwan Strait.

As US military primacy in the western Pacific erodes, the United States and Japan now operate under a contested space. As a result, instead of relying on military primacy, an approach that focuses on enhancing force survivability and restricting China’s freedom of movement to complicate a war has become a central component of US defense strategy in the region. The different measures taken to implement such an approach to deterrence have broader benefits that contribute to improving the military balance over the Taiwan Strait. The United States and Japan have been investing in measures such as modernizing the alliance’s command and control (C2) structure, fortifying Japan’s Sakishima Islands, and expanding multilateral defense partnerships. These steps could significantly complicate China’s calculus in initiating a full-scale military action against Taiwan, chiefly by denying Beijing the ability to achieve a quick victory or prevail in a protracted war, making a military option unattractive for China. Many of the measures are still at a nascent stage and face political and organizational hurdles for full implementation. Nevertheless, they could all play an important role in shaping Chinese perceptions about the regional military balance across the Taiwan Strait.

### 1AR---AT: Taiwan War

#### No Taiwan invasion. The island’s hardened military capability, resilient economy, and robust democracy ensure a lethal response even if U.S. support diminishes. That’s Gordon.

#### Taiwan’s military capabilities are strong and Xi’s too unhappy with his military to risk conflict.

Gordon & Hass 24 [Phillip, Sydney Stein, Jr., Scholar at the Brookings Institution. He was National Security Adviser to Vice President Kamala Harris and is the author of Losing the Long Game: The False Promise, Ryan, Senior Fellow, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center, and Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies in the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. From 2013 to 2017, he served as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the U.S. National Security Council., “Nobody Lost Taiwan: The Island Remains Secure and Stable—for Now”, 9-22-2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/nobody-lost-taiwan]

But Taiwan has not been standing still. Over the past several years, Taiwan’s political and military leadership has agreed to an asymmetric defensive strategy and aligned the Taiwanese military’s doctrine, force structure, and spending decisions around it. Largely gone are the days of overinvesting in expensive, high-end military capabilities to confront Chinese forces at the centerline of the Taiwan Strait. Now, Taiwan is concentrating resources on making the island the equivalent of a porcupine—prickly to touch and impossible to swallow. Taiwan’s defense innovations are also being turbocharged by lessons drawn from Ukraine’s resistance to Russia. This includes launching a whole-of-society resilience campaign, simulating realistic scenarios of Chinese military attacks in defense training, expanding public participation in civil defense, and simulating responses to cyberattacks and gray-zone threats. In 2022, Taiwan formed the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency to better integrate reserve forces for defense. Taiwan’s defense leaders also are training and empowering field commanders to take initiative rather than wait for centralized directives.

Taiwan is retiring legacy systems, such as Cold War–era fighter jets and tanks, and instead deploying a variety of modern capabilities, such as HIMARS multiple-launch rocket systems and NASAMS 3 air defense systems, which have been effective in Ukraine. American companies and Taiwanese entities also are pursuing novel new partnerships to marry American defense innovation with Taiwan’s world-class advanced manufacturing. Joint arms production is rapidly expanding. Advanced defense technology firms are working with Taiwan to expand the island’s access to cutting-edge capabilities, such as loitering munitions, sea mines, unmanned aerial systems, unmanned surface vehicles, unmanned underwater vehicles, and electronic warfare and communications equipment. There also is consensus across Taiwan’s political spectrum to increase defense spending: Lai has pledged to lift defense spending to more than three percent of GDP next year and more than five percent by 2030.

Taiwan must follow up on these pledges, and further reforms are needed, with more urgency, to consolidate its defense preparedness. But it is moving in the right direction.

The United States and its partners also have taken steps to thwart China’s military designs on Taiwan. In recent years, Washington has, for the first time, provided military aid to Taiwan by drawing directly from existing U.S. weapons stockpiles—a method previously reserved for urgent support to allies in active conflict. And it has authorized Taiwan for foreign military financing, which provides grants and loans so Taiwan can purchase American-made defense equipment. The United States and its partners—including Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam—are also advancing a “dispersal strategy” across the Pacific to support power projection from multiple sites, and the United States is pre-positioning munitions and other asymmetric capabilities at bases across the region to augment deterrence. Many of these regional partners are also building up their own advanced force projection capabilities and working more closely with Taipei on upholding freedom of navigation and maritime security.

Finally, for all Beijing’s formidable and growing military strength, it still confronts important internal challenges. Many of China’s top military officials have been purged during Xi’s third term on charges of corruption or disloyalty. As Jonathan Czin and John Culver have written in Foreign Affairs, Xi does not have the military he wants and does not seem to trust that the military he has would deliver on his directives.

#### Taiwanese political solidarity ensures Chinese propaganda efforts fail.

Gordon & Hass 24 [Phillip, Sydney Stein, Jr., Scholar at the Brookings Institution. He was National Security Adviser to Vice President Kamala Harris and is the author of Losing the Long Game: The False Promise, Ryan, Senior Fellow, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center, and Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies in the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. From 2013 to 2017, he served as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the U.S. National Security Council., “Nobody Lost Taiwan: The Island Remains Secure and Stable—for Now”, 9-22-2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/nobody-lost-taiwan]

A New Equilibrium

Taiwan is also better prepared for a Chinese infiltration campaign than many realize—including those in Beijing. China is devoting considerable resources to influence public opinion in Taiwan, including through cyberattacks, propaganda, acquisitions of Taiwanese media companies, and the use of social media platforms such as TikTok—all of which are designed to co-opt Taiwan residents with sympathies toward Beijing to promote eventual unification. China’s goal is to induce the people of Taiwan to conclude that resistance is futile and thus consent to unification. But there is little evidence that these efforts are working.

The reason is simple. Very few people in Taiwan are susceptible to Chinese propaganda. Even as they are divided along partisan lines, Taiwan’s public is unified and consistent in its strong opposition to communism and its desire to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic norms. In fact, the more aggressive Beijing has become toward Taiwan, the more Beijing has repelled rather than attracted the people of Taiwan. As Lev Nachman and Wei-Ting Yen wrote in Foreign Affairs, “Many of Beijing’s efforts to scare Taiwanese citizens invoke more cringe than panic.”

According to recent public opinion polls, over 90 percent of people in Taiwan feel either “Taiwanese” (63 percent) or “both Taiwanese and Chinese” (30 percent) as opposed to less than five percent who feel “Chinese.” The vast majority support upholding the cross-strait status quo, compared with less than eight percent who want unification with China “as soon as possible” (two percent) or even eventually (six percent), leaving Beijing little to work with. There is no doubt that Chinese efforts at infiltration combined with military pressure—such as cyberattacks or a naval blockade under the guise of customs enforcement—would be a major challenge to Taiwan, but such measures could just as easily foment hostility toward Beijing as weaken Taiwanese resolve.

The degree of polarization in Taiwanese politics can also be exaggerated. There are examples of troubling rhetoric, including Lai’s recent reference to hammering “impurities” out of Taiwan’s political system and an opposition politician’s comparison of some of Lai’s actions to “those of Nazi Germany.” But take a step back and Taiwan’s politics appear rather consensual on the big issues. None of Taiwan’s three main political parties—Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party, the opposition Kuomintang, and Taiwan People’s Party—support unification with Beijing. All are pro-democracy and anticommunist, all want to maintain ties with the United States, and none support immediate independence. The main distinction among the parties is over how best to preserve the cross-strait status quo, not whether to do so. The three parties agree on virtually all domestic issues, with the exceptions of nuclear energy and the death penalty. On most issues, their differences are more about personalities than ideology.

Compared with Taiwan’s past and other advanced democracies today, Taiwan’s politics are rather tame. Far from descending into deepening partisan divisions, Taiwan may be moving toward a new political equilibrium. Leaders of all three major parties acknowledge that they will need to compromise to move forward a special defense budget, which they all view as critical for Taiwan’s security. There also appears to be a cross-partisan consensus that now is not a time to test global tolerance for Taiwan’s independence but rather a moment to show Taiwan as a contributor to regional stability.

## Exports

### 1AR---Nuke Terror

#### Nuke terror causes extinction. NC3 system failure shifts states towards nuclear use which creates action-reaction spirals that draw in great powers. That’s Hayes.

[ ] AT: No Motive   
Yes motive. Our ev says there’s several non-state actors that are motivated and able---that’s Hayes.

[ ] AT: No means   
Doesn’t assume our internal link. Use tightens decision making windows that makes states more likely to accede to non-state actor demands.

[ [AT: Can’t acquire

Yes acquisition. Our ev says acquisition is certainly reachable even if there’s a high bar---that’s Hayes.

### 1AR---Diplomacy

#### US diplomacy solves great power war. Reconceptualizing the role from hegemon to shared leadership maintains an acceptable balance of power and avoids great power war over primacy. That’s Ashford

#### It's reverse causal. US diplomacy stands up to regional aggression and secures peace. That’s Beckley.

### 1AR---FNPPs

#### Russian and Chinese FNPPs cause extinction. Environmental effects and theft attractiveness creates risk for meltdowns that creates global health risks. That’s Sullivan. Only disincentivizing their exports through market signals solve.

## T Subsets

### 1AR---AT: “The/USFG”

#### ‘The’ doesn’t modify CBRs, the res only says before USFG and US so it’s irrelevant

### 1AR---AT: In means Throughout

#### Wrong. In means within AND this also is a definition of ‘the’ since it’s defining “in the United States”

Cullen 52 – Cullen, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 52, Commissioner, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, November 13, 1952 Riehl et al. V. Kentucky unemployment compensation commission; the judgment is affirmed. Rehearing denied; COMBS, J., and SIMS, C. J., dissenting. [http://ky.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19521113\_0040095.KY.htm/](http://ky.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19521113_0040095.KY.htm/qx)

We do not find any ambiguity in KRS 341.070(1). It is our opinion that the key word in the statute is the word 'in,' preceding the words 'each of three calendar quarters', and if the word is accorded its ordinary and common meaning, the statute does not require simultaneous employment. According to Webster's New International Dictionary, the word 'in,' used with relation to a period of time, means 'during the course of.' The same meaning, expressed in another way, would be 'within the limits or duration of.' Employing this meaning, the statute says that an employer is subject to the Act if, during the course of, or within the limits or duration of each of three calendar quarters, he had in covered employment four or more workers, to each of whom the required amount of wages was paid. This clearly means that the employment need not be simultaneous. Obviously, the word 'in' does not mean 'throughout' or 'for the entire period of,' because then there would be no point in adding the requirement of the payment of a minimum of $50 in wages. In these times, no worker employed for a full calendar quarter would be paid less than $50 in wages. The appellant seeks to read into the statute the words 'at the same time,' following the words 'had in covered employment'. There is no justification for this, unless the word 'in' means 'during any one period of time in.' We are not aware of any authority for ascribing such a meaning to the word 'in'.

### 1AR---AT: Strengthen

#### “CBR” “strength” is a scale-based measure of legal discretion---plan increases from level 4 statutory and level 1 Constitutional interps

---statutory / Constitutional levels = Trump’s Executive Orders explicitly in the text interpret CSRA/FSLMRS to delegate discretion via rescheduling and national security exemption, and Article 2 to prohibit any binding CBRs

---pre-Trump CSRA/FSLMRS interp is a level 8, minus the level 7 right to strike (arbitration + FLRA / FSIP is the dispute mechanism, and is empowered to implement a settlement)

---\_\_ = read if going to cross-apply to T: Subs %

Jha et al. 20 [Nandan K. Jha, Department of Political Science, Valdosta State University; Neena **Banerjee**, Department of Political Science, Valdosta State University; and Stephanie **Moller**, Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Charlotte; “Assessing the Role of Teachers’ Unions in the Adoption of Accountability Policies in Public Education,” The Urban Review, 52, June 2020, pp.299-330, DOI 10.1007/s11256-019-00529-y]

Our main independent variable is the strength of teachers’ unions, measured with an index of the strength of collective bargaining rights for local school teachers in states. Freeman and Valletta (1988) originally developed this index and Farber (2006) has extended it until 2004. We have carried forward this index for each state up to 2009. There is very little time-series variation in the collective bargaining rights index (Farber 2006). States account for 74.9% of this variation, followed by year (0.05%) and the remainder by the type of public employee group (Farber 2006, pp. 42–43).

This scale-based measure captures the legal environment of the strength of collective bargaining in each state more comprehensively than other alternatives including the percentage of unionized public school teachers or percentage of school teachers covered by collective bargaining agreements. Hoxby (1996) argued that a simple count of unionized members does not give a full picture of their power. This is because in many instances existing teachers’ professional associations were transformed into teachers’ unions and often retained their original professional orientation rather than identifying with the larger labor movements (Hoxby 1996). Consequently, the large membership base of teachers’ unions may overstate their political influence. Using data on collective bargaining provisions in large school districts of California, several recent studies have also emphasized the effect of the strength of collective bargaining contracts between teachers’ unions and school districts on student performance, educational productivity, and resource allocation rather than relying on the percentage of teachers as members of teachers’ unions for the purpose (Moe 2009; Strunk and Grissom 2010; Strunk and McEachin 2011). Given the focus of this paper on the broader issue of state policy adoption, measuring the legal environment with regard to collective bargaining is a better strategy than simply using union membership rates or the percentage of teachers covered by collective bargaining. The recent legislative fight over curtailment of collective bargaining rights in Wisconsin also supports the importance of legal environment of collective bargaining. Moreover, union coverage is significantly higher in states that have more favorable collective bargaining rights for all types of workers (Farber 2006). Union coverage is the “fraction of workers who report either being a union member or being a nonmember covered by a collective bargaining agreement” (Farber 2006, p. 43). We also noted high correlations (not shown here) between the collective bargaining rights index, the percentage of teachers covered by collective bargaining, and the percentage of unionized teachers. However, consistent with the practice in the empirical literature, we included the percentage of teachers covered by collective bargaining as an alternate measure for the collective bargaining power of teachers’ unions.

The index of the strength of collective bargaining rights captures eight different groups of states (Farber 2006; Freeman and Valletta 1988) in which bargaining:

1. Is legally prohibited;

2. Is not legally prohibited but with absence of provisions;

3. Is permitted but do not require employers to negotiate with unionized workers;

4. Is permitted; unions are allowed to meet and present offers to their employers, but employers retain the discretion to take unilateral decision;

5. Is considered a duty but without specific dispute resolution mechanism;

6. Is considered a duty and dispute resolution occurs through fact finding mechanisms that entail the intervention of a neutral third party that is not empowered to implement a settlement;

7. Is considered a duty, and unions are allowed to strike to make their case;

8. Is considered a duty with compulsory interest arbitration, which empowers the neutral third party to determine the terms of the agreement and guarantee closure of the process.

These eight categories are ranked in order of increasing favorableness for union activities (Farber 2006, p. 42). Although the index of collective bargaining power of teachers’ unions is an ordinal measure with eight distinct values, the general practice in the literature that examines the influence of teachers’ unions in education policy is to treat this index as a continuous measure (Frandsen 2011; Hartney and Flavin 2011; Hirsch et al. 2011). Sociological and psychometric methodologists state that when there are five or more categories, there is relatively little harm in treating ordinal scales as continuous variables (Johnson and Creech 1983; Zumbo and Zimmerman 1993).

### 1AR---Aff Ground

#### Their model destroys aff ground. Only economy-wide private sector affs meet.

#### 1. Squo barriers to labor law. Trump’s attacks on private sector labor make it impossible to credibly win an internal link and union density has been at 6 percent for 5 decades.

#### 2. Employment and antitrust counterplans are OP and no aff has a real CBRs key warrant. States is so threatening we almost made it aff ground.

#### 3. Federal workforce innovation is the only possible way to sustain aff ground since Handler and Bednar aren’t writing us new advantages.

#### Aff ground outweighs. It starts the debate and must innovate over the course of the season. Topics that are too small allow the neg to overprep and makes it impossible to develop strategic options. Compare internal links not impacts.

### 1AR---Precision

#### Precision outweighs. Establishing predictable research burdens centered around literature consensus creates topic education and content retention by encouraging the best researched definitions instead of out of context definitions that don’t reflect the reality of labor policy. The impact is portable research: the only unique benefit of debate is the research skills generated by fostering a model in which teams are rewarded for most accurately depicting the literature and state of labor policy.

#### Three internal links.

#### 1. They’re misreading the resolution since ‘substantially’ comes before ‘strengthen’, not ‘workers’

#### 2. Their cards are imprecise.

#### Yennamaneni card is about gig workers

#### David card is about substantial contributions to foundations being 2%--not about labor and obv unpredictable

#### US Code card about benefits, not workers

#### Lenne evidence is about australia and not about workers

#### Words and phrases unpredictable and outdated

#### Jiminez SCOTUS precedent card is about substantial being qualitative in the context of patent law, not labor law—not about workers or anything related to the topic

#### Rhoades card is about individual CBAs for grad students being substantial, not about workers

#### This Bozkurt card is the closest they get to a predictable definition–its about a single program BUT also says that in this context that 15 workers was substantially 2% and proves they solve none of their offense!

Dr. Ödül Bozkurt et al. 24, PhD from UCLA, Professor of Work and Employment at University of Sussex Business School, “Consultation on creating a modern framework for industrial relations (2024): Response from High Pay Centre and academics”, https://highpaycentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/industrial-relations-consultationacademics-letter-3.pdf

Currently, the framework for trade unions focuses on rights to access and recognition for trade unions as well as establishing more efficient processes for industrial action. These are very welcome measures that should lead to more workers being able to make a free and informed choice about trade union membership. This in turn should result in more workers with stronger collective bargaining power and representation from a union who can address workplace issues on their behalf.

However, the potential of unions goes beyond pay negotiations and preventing exploitative working practices. As workers’ representatives who can speak freely and frankly to management without fear of recrimination, unions are well-placed to deliver all the benefits of worker voice: better organisational decision-making and performance; higher regard for worker interests, from the shopfloor to the boardroom; a greater sense of agency and control for workers.

Currently, the Information and Consultation of Employees regulations are the most substantial mechanism for enabling worker voice in decision-making, giving employees the right to request that a consultation body be established if at least 2% of the workforce, or 15 people at organisations with fewer than 750 employees. However, uptake of this right has been low, with just 14% of workplaces having either a works council or some form of on-site consultation mechanism according to the 2017 Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices.[9] Research suggests that even where consultation mechanisms have been established, their impact has been highly varied. Even though they are not duty bound to accept the recommendations of workers on major decisions, many employers still fail to share key information important business issues. Consultation bodies often lack access to senior decision-makers and accountability over how views expressed during consultation processes have been acted upon.[10]

#### 3. Scope vs. Strength. Measure strength by legal discretion, not simple count of workers covered. That’s Jha.

### 1AR---Defense

#### Tons of functional limits against single agency affs:

#### 1. Precedent DAs like pres powers or MQD.

#### 2. Process DAs like FLRA overstretch or midterms

#### 3. Courts DAs like sua sponte or court politics

4. CBR PICs and different protections also solve because not all of those 44 workers have

#### Affs getting smaller as an internal link to neg ground is empirically disproven by nukes and clean-energy when everyone got smaller and the neg win rate remained high.

#### We’re reading the biggest aff on the topic, grow up and cut a case neg.